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Introduction: In order to limit rising publicly-financed health expenditure, out-of-pocket payments for health care
services (OOPP) have been raised in many industrialized countries. However, higher health-related OOPP may burden
social subgroups unequally. In Germany, inequalities in OOPP have rarely been analyzed. The aim of this study was to
examine OOPP of the German elderly population in the different sectors of the health care system. Socio-economic
and morbidity-related determinants of inequalities in OOPP were analyzed.
Methods: This cross-sectional analysis used data of N = 3,124 subjects aged 57 to 84 years from a population-based
prospective cohort study (ESTHER study) collected in the Saarland, Germany, from 2008 to 2010. Subjects passed a
geriatric assessment, including a questionnaire for health care utilization and OOPP covering a period of three months
in the following sectors: inpatient care, outpatient physician and non-physician services, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals,
dental prostheses and nursing care. Determinants of OOPP were analyzed by a two-part model. The financial burden of
OOPP for certain social subgroups (measured by the OOPP-income-ratio) was investigated by a generalized linear model
for the binomial family.
Results: Mean OOPP during three months amounted to €119, with 34% for medical supplies, 22% for dental prostheses,
21% for pharmaceuticals, 17% for outpatient physician and non-physician services, 5% for inpatient care and 1% for
nursing care. The two-part model showed a significant positive association between income (square root equivalence
scale) and total OOPP. Increasing morbidity was associated with significantly higher total OOPP, and in particular with
higher OOPP for pharmaceuticals. Total OOPP amounted to about 3% of disposable income. The generalized linear
model for the binomial family showed a significantly lower financial burden for the wealthiest quintile as compared to
the poorest one.
Conclusions: This is the first study providing evidence of inequalities in OOPP in the German elderly population.
Socio-economic and morbidity-related inequalities in OOPP and the resulting financial burden could be identified. The
results of this study may contribute to the discussion about the mechanisms causing the observed inequalities and can
thus help decision makers to consider them when adapting future regulations on OOPP.
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Background
Health expenditure has increased in virtually all countries
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) over the last years [1]. In order to limit
rising publicly-financed health expenditure, out-of-pocket
payments for health care services (OOPP) were introduced
or raised in many OECD countries [2]. There are two
main goals of OOPP. Firstly, they are intended to reduce
inefficiencies that could result from the phenomenon that
is referred to as ‘moral hazard’. The idea behind this is that
patients might tend to utilize health care services too fre-
quently when they are free of charge. By being forced to
contribute to health care costs directly, patients may re-
duce their health care utilization. Secondly, OOPP can
serve as a crude means of financing the health care system
without increasing taxes or social security contributions.
This aspect becomes more and more important since many
OECD countries are in a general tight budgetary situation.
However, the implementation of patients’ direct contri-
bution to health care costs entails the danger of burdening
different social sub-groups unequally. Therefore, the ques-
tion of especially income-, gender- and education-related
inequalities in OOPP has often been examined, mostly fo-
cusing on the elderly due to their higher health-related re-
source utilization [3].
Nonetheless, corresponding evidence from Germany,
the third largest OECD economy [4], is missing. Germany
has one of the most expensive health care systems both in
absolute numbers and compared to its gross domestic
product. Additionally, Germany has one of the oldest pop-
ulations in the world with a large, still growing proportion
of elderly people [5]. Within the German health care sys-
tem, there is a comprehensive system of OOPP.
Regulation of OOPP in Germany
Approximately 88% of the German population is insured
by a statutory health insurance (SHI). Compulsory bene-
ficiaries of the German SHI are especially employees
under a certain income threshold. Self-employed, and em-
ployees above the threshold can choose between SHI and
private health insurance (PHI). Civil servants, pensioners
and their families profit moreover from governmental
schemes (GS) that cover a percentage of the health-related
financial risk so that a PHI only has to cover the residual
risk. Regardless of the type of health insurance, all benefi-
ciaries have access to comprehensive health care services,
including out- and inpatient services and pharmaceuticals.
As the vast majority of the German population is in a
SHI, following explanations will focus on the regulations
of OOPP in the SHI from 2008 to 2010, the time of data
collection of this study. OOPP existed in the German
SHI for all health-care services from 2008 to 2012 with-
out regulatory changes [6]. Table 1 gives an overviewabout the regulation of OOPP in the SHI in the relevant
sectors. Additionally to these regulations, a beneficiary
had to pay maximally OOPP up to the amount of 2% of
his or her gross income. This rule was designed to limit
the potential financial burden due to OOPP. If a benefi-
ciary was chronically ill, which was proven by having the
same diagnosis over several quarters, he or she had to
pay up to only 1% of the gross income. The 1%- or 2%-
threshold only became effective upon request at one’s SHI.
Yet, the limitations did not apply for dental prostheses and
goods or services that were not reimbursed by the SHI, e.g.
non-prescription drugs and glasses.
Aim
The aim of this study was to determine the amount of
OOPP elderly people pay in the different sectors of the
German health care system. The elderly were considered
due to their high and continually growing importance
for the German health care system. Furthermore, socio-
economic and morbidity-related determinants of inequal-
ities in OOPP were analyzed. In addition, the financial
burden on various social sub-groups was examined.
Methods
Sample
Data were collected within the eight-year follow-up wave
of the ESTHER study, a large population-based pro-
spective cohort study consisting of 9,949 people aged be-
tween 50 and 74 who were recruited from 2000 to 2002
in the Saarland, Germany. From baseline to this eight-
year follow-up, 499 subjects had died, 505 individuals
were no longer able to participate due to poor health, and
680 had declined further participation. From the remaining
8,265 participants, 6,063 (73.4% response rate) sent back a
detailed questionnaire of the eight-year follow-up. Further
additional information from a questionnaire provided by
their general practitioners was available for 5,056 individ-
uals, and 3,124 participants consented to an additional
three hour geriatric assessment performed by study physi-
cians at their homes. The geriatric assessments were
conducted between July 2008 and December 2010. The
analyses presented here are based on this subsample of
the 3,124 participants. Subjects completed standardized
questionnaires collecting information about medical, socio-
demographic and life-style factors. Among these 3,124
persons, only 3 lived in nursing homes. Further detailed
information about ESTHER has been reported else-
where [7-9].
Data about OOPP were collected using a short version
of a previously used [10,11] health economic question-
naire. In this standardized questionnaire, subjects were
asked to report their individual health-related resource
utilization during the three-month period preceding the
interview in the following sectors: inpatient care, outpatient
Table 1 Overview: OOPP within German statutory health insurance (2008–2012)
Resource Regulation of OOPP
Inpatient care 10 Euro per day for not more than 28 days in hospitals and follow-up-rehabilitations.
Outpatient services Physicians: 10 Euro per quarter for the first contact with a general practitioner or specialist;
Dentists: 10 Euro per quarter for the first contact; Non-Physicians: 10 Euro per prescription and 10% of costs.
Medical supplies Permanent use: 10% of costs but not more than 10 Euro per month;
single use: 10% of costs not less than 5 Euro and not more than 10 Euro; glasses are not reimbursed.
Pharmaceuticals 10% of costs but not less than 5 Euro and not more than 10 Euro per drug; non-prescription drugs are not reimbursed.
Dental prostheses SHI reimburses 50% of costs, in case of regularly check-ups in the last 5 (10) years 70% (80%).
Nursing care 10 Euro per prescription plus 10 Euro per day for the first 28 days.
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theses and nursing care. Here, inpatient care included
hospital and rehabilitation stays. Outpatient care covered
physician and non-physician (e.g. physiotherapy) services
and medical supplies are all medical devices that aimed
at preventing, alleviating or treating diseases. Pharmaceu-
ticals included both prescription and over-the-counter
drugs, and nursing care covered both formal and informal
care. Following questions to the respective health care
utilization, subjects were then asked to report the individ-
ual amount of money they had to pay for the correspond-
ing sector out-of-pocket during the three-month period.
Out-of-pocket payments
OOPP (synonyms are out-of-pocket expenditures, co-pay-
ments) appear in three different forms [3]: As deductibles
before the insurance steps in, as additional payments when
a stipulated threshold is reached and as direct contribu-
tions to costs when utilizing health care services. In the
German health care context deductibles chiefly exist in the
PHI; additional payments exist mostly for medical supplies
and dental prostheses in the SHI, and direct contributions
exist only in the SHI (legal co-payment) in all relevant
health care sectors. All three types of OOPP were consid-
ered in this study.
Income and burden
Income was measured as disposable, net income from
all sources of income after taxes of the entire household.
Subjects’ household income was then adjusted in order
to account for the household size. For that, the square
root equivalence scale was used [12], which divides the
total net household income by the square root of house-
hold size. Thus, the income of different household sizes
became comparable, and synergies of larger households
compared to single households were taken into account.
As OOPP were collected for a period of three months
while the net household income was collected and calcu-
lated per month, the latter was multiplied by three in order
to keep income and OOPP comparable. The resulting fi-
nancial burden to patients due to OOPP was measured by
the ratio of OOPP and income.Illness level
Morbidity was measured by the Cumulative Illness Rating
Scale for Geriatrics (CIRS-G) [13], which is a modified
version of the Cumulative Illness Rating Scale [14]. The
CIRS-G assesses the severity of illnesses in 13 somatic cat-
egories and one psychiatric category by 0 to 4 points for
each category. One total score is created, consisting of the
sum of each category’s points. Likewise, the CIRS-G takes
into account both the number of illnesses and their re-
spective severity, combining both to an index that can
range (theoretically) from 0 to 56.
Socio-demographic variables
According to Andersen’s definition of ‘predisposing fac-
tors’ for health care utilization [15], the following socio-
demographic variables were collected and are considered
in this study: age, gender, marital status and education.
The self-reported marital status distinguished between sin-
gle, married, divorced and widowed. The level of education
referred to the time of primary and secondary school edu-
cation and could vary between ‘under ten years’ , ‘ten to
eleven years’ and ‘more than eleven years’. Additionally,
the type of health insurance was considered. Since the
number of subjects covered by the above-mentioned gov-
ernmental schemes is negligible, the status of health insur-
ance could only vary between SHI and PHI, the latter
including individuals covered by GS.
Statistical analyses
All statistical analyses were performed using Stata 11 SE.
The level of significance was set at α = 0.05. Differences
in means were analyzed using the Student’s t-test. Due
to the fact that many respondents reported no OOPP
for the preceding three months for sectoral and total
OOPP, a two-part model was applied to analyze determi-
nants of OOPP. This is recommended for health ex-
penses data which contain a substantial number of zeros
[16]. The first part of the model estimates the probability
of having any positive OOPP by means of a logistic regres-
sion. In the second part, the expected individual levels of
OOPP are calculated only for positive OOPP by means of
a general linearized model with gamma distribution and
Table 2 Sample characteristics
All Missings
Characteristics n = 3,124 (%)
Gender: n (%) 3,124 (100) 0
- Male 1,481 (47.41)
- Female 1,643 (52.59)
Age: mean (SD) 69.63 (6.30) 0
Range 57 - 84
Marital status: n (%) 3,087 (100) 1.2
- Single 105 (3.40)
- Married 2,217 (71.82)
- Divorced 229 (7.42)
- Widowed 536 (17.36)
Education: n (%) 3,079 (100) 1.4
- Under 10 years 2,038 (66.19)
- 10–11 years 550 (17.86)
- More than 11 years 491 (15.95)
3-month net incomea: mean (SD) 4,299.13 (2,053.88) 13.1
Health insurance: n (%) 3,100 (100) 0.8
- Statutory 2,859 (92,23)
- Private 241 (7.77)
CIRS-Gb: mean (SD) 6.88 (5.44) 16.8
aSquare root equivalence scale; bCIRS-G: Cumulative Illness Rating Scale for
Geriatrics; SD: standard deviation.
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the positive values is also positively skewed. Estimators
from both models were combined using predictive mar-
gins (recycled predictions) [17] in order to regain one total
prediction estimator for both models that can be inter-
preted in terms of OOPP. As the results for widowed indi-
viduals were strongly influenced by two outliers with very
high OOPP, we deleted them for the two-part regression
analyses.
In order to analyze the burden due to OOPP, a gener-
alized linear model for the binomial family was used. A
logit link function was chosen that is the canonical link
function for generalized linear models for the binomial
family. To execute the model, the ‘binreg’ command in
Stata was used. The model can predict determinants of pro-
portions and requires a dependent variable ranging from ‘0’
to ‘1’. The share of OOPP on income is a proportion. How-
ever, it could occur that total OOPP exceeded the dispos-
able income in the preceding three months. In these cases,
when the dependent variable was greater than ‘1’, the values
were replaced by ‘1’ for the regression model. Furthermore,
income quintiles were constructed and used as control vari-
ables in this model. The standard errors were determined
by non-parametric bootstrapping (1,000 replications) in
order to correct for potentially differently distributed resid-
uals than assumed by the model. The results of this model
were reported in terms of odds ratios.
Missing values
We assumed that participants who left out the question
about the amount of money they spent out-of-pocket in
the respective health care sector did not spend anything
out-of-pocket. As a result, missing values for the vari-
ables containing data about OOPP could not occur. For
all other variables missing values were imputed using mul-
tiple imputation by chained equations in the program ICE
(Royston 2004) in Stata 11 SE. A cycle length of 200 was
chosen and according to recommendations [18] 100 im-
putations were executed.
Results
Socio-demographic and morbidity data
The sample of the eight-year-follow-up consisted of 3,124
participants, 52.6% being female. The mean age was 69.6
years. The majority of participants (71.8%) was married,
17.4% were widowed, 7.4% divorced and 3.4% single. 66.2%
of subjects had passed a school education of less than 10
years, 15.9% 10 or 11 years and 17.9% more than 11 years.
Mean net household equivalence income for three months
was €4,229. 92.2% of participants were insured by a SHI
while 7.8% were insured by a PHI. The average illness level
was assessed with a mean CIRS-G of 6.88 points. Table 2
summarizes the socio-demographic characteristics of the
sample.Analyses of OOPP
Mean OOPP per capita during three months amounted
to €119, with 34% for medical supplies, 22% for dental
prostheses, 21% for pharmaceuticals, 17% for outpatient
care, 5% for inpatient care and 1% for nursing care.
OOPP for medical supplies accounted for one third of
total OOPP, and medical supplies plus dental prostheses
accounted for more than half of total OOPP. OOPP for
nursing care only marginally contributed to total OOPP.
Table 3 shows the corresponding values, adding further
information about gender-related differences of the consid-
ered sample. While in the outpatient sector mean OOPP
were significantly higher for women, the differences were
not significant for the remaining sectors. Also, the higher
total OOPP paid by women (€124) compared to men
(€114) did not prove to be statistically significant.
Table 4 shows the results of the two-part model for
OOPP in different sectors as well as for total OOPP.
The model was not calculated for OOPP for nursing
care since there were only very few positive observations
(16 out of 3,124). The model showed a significant positive
effect of income on total OOPP, predicting additional
OOPP of €11 (p < 0.01) with each €1,000 higher house-
hold income. This positive association between income
and OOPP could be found in particular for the outpa-
tient sector (p < 0.001) and for pharmaceuticals (p < 0.05).
Table 3 Mean three-month OOPP per respondent in € (SD), by gender
Resource All n = 3,124 Male n =1,481 Female n =1,643 p-valuea
Inpatient care 5.60 5.33 5.84 0.762
(47.53) (34.08) (57.01)
Outpatient physician and 19.95 17.96 22.54 0.031
Non-physician services (70.47) (71.57) (69.39)
Medical supplies 40.69 40.42 40.94 0.949
(224.58) (239.12) (210.70)
Pharmaceuticals 25.61 25.77 25.43 0.858
(52.92) (47.13) (58.69)
Dental prostheses 26.57 25.06 27.94 0.769
(274.09) (312.06) (234.76)
Nursing care 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.991
(20.10) (19.63) (20.50)
Total OOPP 119.14 114.32 124.03 0.477
(381.10) (420.53) (341.75)
aDifferences in means: t-test; SD: standard deviation.
Bock et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2014, 13:3 Page 5 of 11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/13/1/3Increasing morbidity – measured by the CIRS-G – was
significantly correlated with higher total OOPP with each
additional point on the CIRS-G scale being associated
with + €3 (p < 0.05). In particular, one additional point on
the CIRS-G scale was associated with about €1 (p < 0.05)
of additional OOPP for pharmaceuticals. Age significantly
influenced OOPP only for pharmaceuticals where every
additional year led to about €0.60 higher OOPP (p < 0.05).
Widowed individuals paid about €6 (p < 0.05) more than
married in the inpatient sector. Furthermore, in the out-
patient sector the model predicted significantly lower
OOPP for singles (p < 0.05) and men (p < 0.01) as well as
for beneficiaries of a PHI (p < 0.05). No significant inequal-
ities in OOPP could be detected for dental prostheses and
medical supplies. The coefficients for the combined pre-
dictive margins for the educational level did not become
significant in either health care sector.
Analyses of financial burden due to OOPP
The average burden of OOPP, measured as the ratio of
OOPP and income (square root equivalence scale), was
3.23% (standard deviation: 10.99%). The burden ranged
from 0% for patients without OOPP in the last three
months to 310%, indicating that OOPP exceeded the
household income by more than three times for the
maximally burdened. The very high financial burden prob-
ably resulted from the short observation period (three
months). Thus, the purchase of an expensive medical prod-
uct falling in this period of time, e.g. new glasses or dental
prostheses, could have led to the observed values.
The generalized linear model for the binomial family
with logit link predicted a higher burden for women and
SHI-beneficiaries, yet without statistically significant effects(Table 5). Likewise, neither the illness level nor the edu-
cational level influenced the burden significantly. How-
ever, the model showed a significantly higher burden for
widowed as compared to married individuals. The bur-
den of widowed individuals exceeded those of married
persons by about 42% (p < 0.05). This significant associ-
ation also persisted after excluding the two widowed
outliers with very high OOPP from regression analysis,
although then widowed individuals were predicted to be
burdened more than married individuals by only about
32%. Compared to the lowest income quintile, all higher
income quintiles showed a lower burden. The wealthiest
income quintile was predicted to be burdened by OOPP of
about 52% less than the poorest income quintile (p < 0.01).
Additionally, age was positively associated with a higher fi-
nancial burden, with each additional year being associated
with a 1.7% higher burden (p < 0.05).
Discussion
Main findings
The aim of this study was to analyze inequalities in OOPP
among elderly Germans. Main findings were, firstly, that
the greatest share of mean OOPP of €119 for a three-
month period were paid for medical supplies, dental pros-
theses and pharmaceuticals. Total OOPP amounted to
3.23% of disposable income (square root equivalence scale).
Secondly, higher income was associated with higher total
OOPP, amounting to + €11 of total OOPP per each €1,000
higher income. Nonetheless, the wealthiest quintile had a
significantly smaller financial burden than the poorest
one. Thirdly, an increasing illness level was associated with
higher total OOPP. And fourthly, age was associated with
a higher burden and significant sectoral lower OOPP could
Table 4 Two-part model (1. Logit, 2. GLMa) with OOPPb as dependent variable
Total Inpatient Outpatient
Independent variables Logit OR (SE) GLM b (SE) Predict. margin Logit OR (SE) GLM b (SE) Predict. margin Logit OR (SE) GLM b (SE) Predict. margin
Male gender 0.92 −0.07 −10.37 1.28 −0.05 1.06 0.89 −0.31** −7.23**
(Ref.: Female) (0.09) (0.11) (13.27) (0.23) (0.17) (1.37) (0.07) (0.12) (2.51)
Private health insurance 0,29*** 0.40 4.22 1.05 −0.42 −1,76 0.18 0.56 −7-74*
(Ref.: Statutory) (0.05) (0.23) (28.53) (0.35) (0.30) (1.80) (0.03) (0.32) (4.38)
Age 1.00 0.01 1.29 0.99 0.02 0.07 0.98*** −0.01 −0.34
(0.01) (0.01) (1.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20)
Education (Ref.: < 10 y.)
- 10–11 years 1.33* 0.09 17.35 0.87* 0.76*** 4.23 1.15 0.19 5.16
(0.17) (0.14) (17.87) (0.21) (0.23) (2.64) (0.12) (0.15) (3.38)
- > 11 years 1.18 −0.00 3.92 0.61 0.43 −0.19 1.15 0.30 7.98
(0.17) (0.16) (18.79) (0.18) (0.28) (1.80) (0.14) (0.17) (4.21)
Illness level – CIRS-Gc 1.00 0.03* 3.12* 1.03* 0.01 0.26 0.99 0.01 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (1.27) (0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.23)
Marital status (Ref: married)
- Single 0.81 0.40 46.24 2.06 −0.18 2.82 0.94 −0.70* −10.75*
(0.19) (0.31) (45.87) (0.76) (0.35) (3.34) (0.19) (0.31) (3.43)
- Divorced 0.87 0.08 5.72 0.98 0.06 0.19 0.86 −0.16 −4.31
(0.15) (0.21) (23.56) (0.36) (0.33) (2.18) (0.13) (0.22) (3.86)
- Widowed 1.08 0.25 33.62 1.54 0.48* 6.24* 1.01 0.06 1.48
(0.15) (0.15) (20.78) (0.36) (0.22) (2.87) (0.11) (0.16) (3.66)
Incomed 1.03 0.09** 11.15** 1.09 −0.04 0.25 1.07** 0.12*** 3.11***
(0.03) (0.03) (3.80) (0.05) (0.05) (0.36) (0.02) (0.03) (0.73)
Constant 3.55*** 2.84** 3.47***
(0.62) (0.95) (0.68)
N 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122
Medical supplies Dental prostheses Pharmaceuticals
Independent variables Logit OR (SE) GLM b (SE) Predict. margin Logit OR (SE) GLM b (SE) Predict. margin Logit OR (SE) GLM b (SE) Predict. margin
Male gender 0.87 0.22 4.14 0.93 −0.28 −9.06 0.99 −0.09 −2.84
(Ref.: Female) (0.09) (0.21) (9.08) (0.19) (0.26) (8.65) (0.08) (0.07) (2.41)
Private health insurance 0.63* 0.11 −9.62 0.29* 2.12** 35.64 0.52*** 0.62*** 11.84


















Table 4 Two-part model (1. Logit, 2. GLMa) with OOPPb as dependent variable (Continued)
Age 1.01 −0.00 0.19 1.03 −0.01 0.32 1.00 0.02*** 0.59*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.69) (0.02) (0.02) (0.65) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19)
Education (Ref.: < 10 y.)
- 10–11 years 1.01 −0.13 −4.84 1.17 0.16 9.85 1.08 −0.03 0.64
(0.13) (0.25) (10.20) (0.28) (0.32) (13.47) (0.11) (0.09) (3.20)
- > 11 years 0.87 −0.06 −6.79 0.78 −0.21 −9.64 1.07 0.04 0.83
(0.13) (0.30) (11.78) (0.25) (0.40) (10.31) (0.13) (0.10) (3.47)
Illness level – CIRS-Gc 1.01 −0.02 −0.43 1.00 0.05* 1.33 1.02 0.03*** 0.98*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.83) (0.02) (0.02) (0.83) (0.01) (0.01) (0.24)
Marital status (Ref: married)
- Single 0.97 0.37 18.52 1.08 1.04 46.84 0.78 0.13 4.07
(0.27) (0.66) (30.21) (0.57) (0.67) (57.3) (0.16) (0.19) (9.05)
- Divorced 1.15 −0.08 2.27 1.43 −0.11 5.94 0.88 0.14 2.68
(0.21) (0.42) (13.87) (0.49) (0.46) (15.72) (0.13) (0.13) (4.71)
- Widowed 1.49** 0.34 32.23 1.25 0.06 7.10 1.16 −0.03 1.11
(0.19) (0.30) (17.02) (0.31) (0.32) (11.36) (0.13) (0.09) (3.21)
Incomed 1.02 0.07 3.69 1.06 0.08 3.60 1.02 0.05** 1.74*
(0.03) (0.06) (2.43) (0.06) (0.08) (2.66) (0.02) (0.02) (0.69)
Constant 5.17*** 6.48*** 1.51***
(1.21) (1.31) (0.39)
N 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122 3,122
aGeneralized linear model with log link and gamma distribution bout-of-pocket payments cCumulative Illness Rating Scale for Geriatrics d3-month net income in €1,000 (square root equivalence scale); OR: Odds ratio;


















Table 5 Generalized linear model for the binomial family
(logit link) with financial burdena as dependent variable
Independent predictor variables Odds ratio 95% CI
Male gender (reference: female) 0.880 (0.708 1.093)
Private health insurance (reference: SHI) 0.890 (0.564 1.405)
Age 1.017* (1.001 1.034)
Education 10–11 years (reference: <10 years) 1.090 (0.842 1.410)
>11 years 0.929 (0.693 1.245)
Illness level – CIRS-Gb 1.020 (0.998 1.042)
Marital status: Single (reference: married) 1.619 (0.812 3.231)
Divorced 1.081 (0.746 1.565)
Widowed 1.418* (1.070 1.880)
Income quintile 2 (reference: quintile 1) 0.708 (0.478 1.047)
Income quintile 3 0.737 (0.520 1.044)
Income quintile 4 0.715 (0.503 1.016)
Income quintile 5 0.478** (0.311 0.733)
N 3,124
aBurden: OOPP to income ratio; bCIRS-G: Cumulative Illness Rating Scale for
Geriatrics; *p < .05 **p < .01; CI: bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals
(1,000 replications).
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married persons in the outpatient sector as well as for PHI
compared to SHI beneficiaries.Hypotheses on causes
Extent and structure of OOPP
Most OOPP were paid for medical supplies. OOPP for
SHI-beneficiaries for medical supplies could occur in
three different manners. Firstly, there was the legal co-
payment that did not exceed €10 per month or prescrip-
tion respectively (see Table 1). Secondly, costs for glasses
had to be borne totally by beneficiaries. Thirdly, medical
supplies that went beyond pure medical necessity (e.g.
electrical wheelchairs) were only reimbursed to the ex-
tent of the costs of a conventional product, resulting in
OOPP accounting for the residual amount. It appears
probable that the OOPP for glasses and medical supplies
that go beyond the legally stipulated amount for com-
mon products mainly caused the relatively high OOPP
in this sector. Glasses are almost always used in the elderly
and – even if normally seldom bought – can be rather
costly. Also, medical supplies that went beyond pure med-
ical necessity could reach very high amounts (e.g. in case an
electrical wheelchair is purchased), leading – even if only
rarely occurring for respondents in the three months – to
high mean OOPP (and a highly skewed distribution of
OOPP for medical supplies).
OOPP for dental prostheses were second highest. In
general, dental prostheses were only reimbursed for SHI-
beneficiaries to the half of costs. In contrast to all theother remaining sectors, OOPP were not limited to 10%
of costs or €10 per unit, leading to relatively high OOPP
in this sector. The third highest amount of OOPP was paid
for pharmaceuticals, for which legal co-payments were lim-
ited to €10 per pack of medication. Additionally to a legal
co-payment, OOPP for non-prescription drugs, which are
not SHI-reimbursed at all, might explain the size of OOPP
for pharmaceuticals.
The structure of sectoral components of total OOPP
suggests that most OOPP were paid in sectors in which
the SHI has completely or partially withdrawn from re-
imbursing health goods and services (i.e. glasses, dental
prostheses, non-prescription drugs). The SHI legal co-
payments did not appear to be the main cost-driver for
total OOPP in the elderly cohort. As a result, there was
a discrepancy between the structure of officially reported
legal SHI-co-payments [19] and the structure of all OOPP
in our cohort. Officially reported legal SHI-co-payments
were led by outpatient care followed by pharmaceuticals
and the inpatient sector in 2009.Income
Increasing income was correlated with higher OOPP
(Table 4). Potentially, the influence of the above described
2%- or 1%-income-threshold could partially contribute to
an explanation of the described phenomenon by limiting
OOPP for goods and services reimbursed by the SHI for
individuals with low income. Nevertheless, the 2%- respect-
ively 1%-threshold for legal co-payments did not show a
preventing effect on the burden of different income quin-
tiles as the lowest quintile had a higher burden than the
highest.
Higher income led to higher OOPP especially in the
outpatient sector, where wealthier people could potentially
utilize certain so-called non-covered individual health ser-
vices (IHS) more often. These are services that go beyond
legally stipulated patient care and must be completely paid
by the patient. Examples for IHS are the measurement of
the eye pressure without certain medical indication by an
eye specialist or professional tooth cleaning by a dentist.
As it is the nature of these services that they are not com-
pletely necessary from a medical point of view, it appears
probable that wealthier people afforded more of them
whereas poorer patients avoided them, leading to the ob-
served positive association of income and OOPP.Illness level
The illness level – measured by the CIRS-G – had a sig-
nificant effect on total OOPP. This appears to be natural
as a higher illness level leads to a higher need and thus a
higher demand for health care services. And – following
this crude logic – higher demand leads to higher resource
utilization that entails higher corresponding OOPP. This
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ticular been seen for pharmaceuticals.
However, for all other sectors this does not apply. This
finding might be explained by the high variance of OOPP
in these sectors (e.g. medicals supplies and dental pros-
theses). Likewise, days in hospitals are rare events, leading
to the same effect of a very high variance for the regarded
three-month period, eventually preventing the positive as-
sociation between CIRS-G and inpatient OOPP from be-
ing statistically significant.
Other socio-demographic variables
Age was associated significantly with a higher financial
burden. This might be the result of decreasing income
with higher age. Besides, higher age normally is associ-
ated with a lower health status that is not completely
captured by the CIRS-G, leading to higher service use
and corresponding OOPP.
Women and single persons paid significantly more OOPP
in the outpatient sector than men and married individuals
respectively (see Table 4). There are two potential causes
for that. Firstly, a different structure of resource utilization
by certain subgroups compared to others could entail a dif-
ferent corresponding size of OOPP. For example, it is well
known for the German health care context that women
utilize outpatient physician services more frequently than
men do [20]. Higher service utilization could thus lead in
this sector to higher OOPP for women. Yet, in this ex-
ample, a SHI-insured woman only had to pay €10 per quar-
ter for the first outpatient physician contact regardless of
the concrete amount of contacts in one quarter (Table 1).
And as virtually all participants had at least one contact
with a physician gender-related differences can hardly result
from this legal co-payment of €10 per quarter. However,
patients could moreover utilize the above-described
IHS, which could explain the gender-related inequality
for outpatient care. Additionally, the regulation scheme
for OOPP in the outpatient non-physician part – for
which patients had to pay €10 per prescription and 10%
of costs – could also contribute to an explanation of the
observed inequalities. Due to the payable OOPP per contact
for non-physicians higher resource utilization by women
could also have contributed to the resulting gender-related
inequalities.
These explanations illustrate that deviating resource
utilization of certain subgroups and corresponding legal
regulation of OOPP must be considered simultaneously in
order to explain detected inequalities. Likewise, the fact
that PHI beneficiaries paid lower OOPP in the outpatient
sector would be explained by the existence of the quar-
terly co-payment of €10 for SHI beneficiaries that PHI
beneficiaries did not have to pay. Moreover, PHI benefi-
ciaries did not have to pay OOPP for non-physician ser-
vices so that they were burdened much less in this sector.International comparison
Due to a long tradition with a comprehensive system of
OOPP, most published studies focus on inequalities in
OOPP in the United States (US) [3], often with special re-
gard towards OOPP for pharmaceuticals [21-27]. Thus, in
the following the main findings of this study were com-
pared to evidence from the US.
In contrast to the US, OOPP on pharmaceuticals did
not appear to be crucial for inequalities in OOPP and
the burden in Germany. Thus, in our study, mean OOPP
for pharmaceuticals only accounted for 21% of average
OOPP. Besides, only few determinants, such as morbid-
ity, age and income significantly influenced OOPP for
pharmaceuticals, whilst in the US more determinants
like gender could be identified [25]. The importance of
the pharmaceutical sector for inequalities in OOPP in
the US is in contrast to the findings in Germany and most
likely resulted from a lower, varying insurance coverage of
pharmaceuticals in the US. In Germany, irrespective of
type of health insurance, all beneficiaries profited from a
very comprehensive coverage of pharmaceutical expenses.
Likewise, the often investigated problem of non-adherence
due to financial reason [21,27] appears to be rather im-
plausible for the German health care context.
The average financial burden due to OOPP in the eld-
erly appeared to be much lower in Germany than in the
US. Whilst in this population-based cohort study it was
about three percent, Crystal et al. reported a mean bur-
den for the large group of Medicare beneficiaries of 19
percent [28]. In our study, the type of health insurance
did neither influence total OOPP nor the resulting bur-
den significantly. This is in contrast to findings in the
US where the type of insurance decisively influenced the
financial burden [29-31]. This probably is a result of a
much larger heterogeneity among the different types of
health insurances available for the elderly in the US,
whereas both PHI and SHI in Germany are obliged to
offer a comprehensive coverage, especially for the in-
and outpatient sector and pharmaceuticals.Strengths and limitations
The analyses are based on a large cohort of elderly
Germans. At baseline recruitment from 2000 to 2002
participants were almost representative with regard to
age and gender for the entire population aged 50 to 74 in
the Saarland, Germany [8]. From ESTHER-baseline to the
eight-year follow-up 499 participants deceased and 505
people were no longer able to participate for health rea-
sons. This might have led to an underestimation of the ill-
ness level in the ESTHER-sample as compared to the
entire elderly population. Besides, only 3 individuals living
in nursing homes could be recruited for the sample, lead-
ing to low mean OOPP for nursing care in our study.
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OOPP. Arguably, the short period of time participants
had to report OOPP might have contributed to the highly
positively skewed distribution of OOPP. Rare events like
the purchase of (expensive) medical supplies might have
fallen in this recall period only for very few subjects whilst
a vast majority had little or no OOPP. Due to this rela-
tively small recall period in the questionnaire, the variance
of OOPP became high, probably preventing existing cor-
relations from being observed by the used models. On the
other hand, the small recall period is likely to have mini-
mized a potential recall bias.
Conclusion
Despite an – in comparison to the US – relatively small
burden of OOPP in the elderly German population
today, decision makers will have to continue focusing on
resulting inequalities due to OOPP. Medical progress as
well as the demographic change in future Germany will
certainly lead to rising OOPP in the long term. The
present study can help decision makers by stating current
inequalities, discussing the mechanism causing them and
thus making decision makers to take them into account
when adapting OOPP-relevant regulations.
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